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Abstract—We introduce an adversarial sample detection algo-
rithm based on image residuals, specifically designed to guard
against patch-based attacks. The image residual is obtained as the
difference between an input image and a denoised version of it,
and a discriminator is trained to distinguish between clean and
adversarial samples. More precisely, we use a wavelet domain
algorithm for denoising images and demonstrate that the ob-
tained residuals act as a digital fingerprint for adversarial attacks.
To emulate the limitations of a physical adversary, we evaluate
the performance of our approach against localized (patch-based)
adversarial attacks, including in settings where the adversary has
complete knowledge about the detection scheme. Our results show
that our proposed method generalizes to stronger attacks and
reduces the success rate (conversely, increases the computational
effort) of an adaptive attacker.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, deep neural networks (DNNs) have
been demonstrated to match and surpass human performance
on image classification tasks and have become ubiquitous in
machine learning. At the same time, DNNs have been shown
to be very fragile to adversarial examples [1], in which a
malicious user perturbs natural images such that they are
misclassified by the model. A growing body of research in-
vestigates adversarial defense methods and their shortcomings
[2], [3]. Anomaly detection is one of two currently widely
investigated lines of defense and is differentiated (but not
necessarily in opposition) from robustness, where the goal is to
recover the ground truth from the perturbed test sample. In our
work, we develop a solution for the detection problem, with
applications in security systems that can alert human operators
and prompt intervention (e.g., security cameras, autonomous
driving) when abnormal samples are detected.
Recent work has investigated adversarial patch attacks as
a step towards physically realizable and robust threat models
[4], [5]. Through careful digital design, physical adversarial
patches represent a currently unsolved security threat. We
focus on the task of detecting patch attacks at test time
through the use of a detection block trained on a small
subset of samples within the adversary’s model. We introduce
multiple threat models that follow the taxonomy in [3] with
the common characteristic that they are all confined to a digital
patch attack: given a clean test sample, the adversary can only
modify a contiguous, rectangular region of it, with a size up
to 6.25% of the image. We consider both the cases of norm-
bounded and unbounded adversaries operating on the patch.
Central to our approach is the idea of detecting adversarial
samples based on image residuals, obtained as the difference
between an input image and a denoised version of it. These
residuals are used to train a secondary, much smaller and
heavily regularized detection neural network. We experimen-
tally demonstrate that the proposed method is robust and
generalized to different patch-based attacks, including much
stronger than the ones used to train the detector network. We
show that this generalization does not happen for state-of-the-
art detection methods that are not specifically designed for
patch threat models. Very recent work on defenses against
adversarial patches focuses only on the robustness problem,
not detection [6], [7] to produce certified guarantees. However,
these approaches rely on a brute-force approach that requires
additional complexity at inference time. Thus, there is a
need of specialized solutions for detecting patch adversarial
attacks, and we hope our work provides a baseline in this
direction. Source code is available at https://github.
com/mariusarvinte/wavelet-patch-detection.
We carry out experiments on the CIFAR-10 dataset [8]
with a VGG-19 [9] deep convolutional classifier architecture
and show that current state-of-the-art detection methods do
not generalize to different patch attacks, while our proposed
solution does. The performance of our scheme is evaluated
against full- and limited-knowledge adversaries that attempt
to bypass the issue of zero gradients coming from the non-
differentiable nature of the wavelet denoising operator, as well
as adversaries that perform a brute-force search for the best
patch location.
Summarized, our contributions are:
• We introduce an adversarial sample detection algorithm
based on image residuals, obtained as the difference
between an image and a wavelet-filtered version of it.
• We investigate the effectiveness of several patch adver-
sarial attacks against our proposed detection scheme and
two other existing detection schemes, showing that our
approach generalizes where prior work does not.
• We show that our approach resists high-confidence trans-
fer attacks, even when the attacker trains a substitute
detector and lowers the success rate of an adaptive attack.
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II. METHODOLOGY
A. Image Residuals
Let Fi(x) denote the output probabilities of a deep neural
network classifier F (·; θF ) with weights θF , where C is the
number of classes, i = 1, . . . , C and x is an input image to
the network, with its true label y. The network is trained to
minimize its loss function L(x, y; θF ); typically, this is chosen
as the categorical cross-entropy between the predicted and
true labels. Let Zi(x) denote the output logits of the network,
where we assume that the last layer uses a softmax activation
and the relationship Fi(x) =
exp(Zi(x))∑
k exp(Zk(x))
holds.
The image residual of x is defined as
R(x) = x− g(x;σ), (1)
where g(x;σ) is a denoising operator that takes as input
the image x and produces a denoised version of it with the
same dimensions. g is adjustable by the parameter σ, which
represents an estimate of the noise power in the image: the
larger σ is chosen, the more aggressive the denoising is,
resulting in a smoother image.
For the rest of our work, we choose g to be a wavelet-
based denoising operator. In particular, we use the adaptive
Bayesian shrinkage algorithm [10], in which σ plays the role
of noise power. Once a residual is obtained, it is passed to
the detector function H(·; θH), parameterized by weights θH .
If an adversarial sample is detected, an alarm is triggered,
otherwise, the most likely class is predicted.
B. Counteracting Blind Spots
Since our approach involves a block that relies on iden-
tifying anomalous high-frequency structure in images, we
anticipate the following weakness: an attacker may employ
very small patches intentionally, leaving no residual signa-
ture. An extreme case of this is the single-pixel attack [11],
which falls in our threat model as a patch of size 1 × 1.
Consequently, we augment our detector by taking inspiration
from the logit margin loss formulation in [3] and the baseline
out-of-distribution detection method introduced in [12]. Let
Di(x), i ∈ {1, . . . , C + 1} be the logits of the joint classifier-
detector, given by
Di(x) =
{
Zi(x) ,∀i ∈ 1, . . . , C
(1 + Y (x)) maxj Zj(x) , i = C + 1
. (2)
The two stage detection procedure is described in Table
I. The core idea is to augment the residual-based detection
by requiring negatively labeled samples pass a confidence
threshold in their predictions. The parameter κdet plays this
role: a sample is declared non-adversarial only if it bypasses
the detector and if the difference between the two highest
prediction logits is at least κdet, implying that we require
natural images to be confidently classified.
TABLE I
TWO-STAGE DETECTION PROCESS
1: Input: Logits Zi(x), Y (x)
2: Output: Detection decision yˆdet
3: Compute logits Dk(x), k = 1, . . . , C + 1
4: Compute k∗ = argmaxk Zk(x)
5: if argmaxkDk(x) == C + 1 then
6: yˆdet = 1
7: else if Zk∗ −maxk,k 6=k∗ Zk < κdet then
8: yˆdet = 1
9: else
10: yˆdet = 0
11: end if
Fig. 1. Average magnitude of residual R for 200 CIFAR-10 test images
different conditions: clean, noisy or attacked with unrestricted patch PGD
with step size 5 and 100 iterations, with restarts until the attack is successful.
Magnitude averaged across all color channels.
C. Motivation
Recent work has investigated the frequency domain sig-
nature of adversarial attacks [13] and has concluded that
adversarial training [14], one of the few unbroken defenses,
decreases model sensitivity to high-frequency components
of the input signal, implying that an undefended network
will be perturbed by these components. We posit that this
phenomenon is more pronounced for patch adversarial attacks,
since distortions caused by the inserted patch will be visible in
the residual R, at least for an adversary that is unaware of the
existence of a detection scheme. At the same time, adaptive
adversaries can try to evade detection by generating smooth
patches, but this will reduce the effective dimension of the
patch, ultimately lowering their success rate.
Figure 1 plots the magnitude of the residual averaged across
200 test samples of the CIFAR-10 dataset in three cases:
the original images, noisy versions of them, and unbounded
projected gradient descent (PGD) adversarial samples corre-
sponding to each original image. The average residual for the
clean and noisy images presents high magnitude values around
the center of the image, where edges are more likely to occur.
For the adversarial examples, the patch is strongly localized in
the residual, even when it is placed in the center, overtaking
the residuals of semantic content in the image.
III. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
A. Patch Adversarial Attacks
We use the same definition of patch adversarial attacks
as [5]: the patch is characterized by a two-dimensional bi-
nary mask m, in which only a contiguous, rectangular, two-
dimensional region S satisfies m(i) = 1,∀i ∈ S, otherwise
m(i) = 0. A patch adversarial sample xadv is given by
xadv = x+δ, where δ is the adversarial perturbation satisfying
δ(Sc) = 0. For most attacks, we assume that the attacker
randomly samples a mask location in the image, but we also
investigate the effectiveness of an adversary that searches
across all possible mask locations.
1) Projected Gradient Descent
PGD [14] is an iterative attack that takes a series of
steps in the gradient direction, each with size step, and
projects the perturbations on the -ball if their norm exceeds
. Additionally, PGD starts from a perturbed point around x.
We use the untargeted, L∞ version of masked PGD, with the
inner step given by
xt+1 = Π1(x
t + Π(step ·m sign(∇xL(x, y; θF )))), (3)
where Π projects each element to the interval [0, ]. Note
that by choosing  = 1, this attack becomes unrestricted in
the pixel space, assuming normalization of images to [0, 1].
2) C&W Attack [15]
This is an optimization-based attack that reparameterizes the
perturbation as δ = 12 (tanh(m  w) + 1) − x and solves the
optimization problem
minw α||δ||p + λf(x+ δ), (4)
where f(x′) = max{maxi 6=t Zi(x′) − Zt(x′),−κadv}, t is
the target label different from the correct class and κadv is
a confidence parameter. The formulation in (4) includes two
hyper-parameters: λ controls the trade-off between the distance
penalty and misclassification, while α ∈ {0, 1} allows us to
run an unrestricted attack. When α = 0, the value of λ does not
matter in the optimization, except for influencing the learning
rate, thus we set it to one.
3) Single-Pixel Attack [11]
This is a powerful attack that only requires probability
outputs of the model and does not use gradient information.
The attack uses a differential evolution algorithm to perturb
a single pixel that misclassifies the image. We evaluate our
performance on this attack since we expect it to be a blind
spot for our proposed definition of image residuals, according
to [2].
B. Existing Detection Algorithms
We compare the performance of our method with two
existing algorithms. The baseline approach in [12] uses the
probability of the predicted class as a discriminant for in- and
out-of-distribution samples. While simple and not intended
for adversarial sample detection, we borrow from this idea
to impose that clean samples pass a confidence limit, as
previously described. This method does not require training.
Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) [16] is a powerful
detection method against non-adaptive adversaries that extracts
a set of statistics for each test sample by computing distances
to k-nearest neighbors in the training set. This method requires
training on adversarial samples and claims generalization
properties, thus we choose it as a comparison.
Our primary purpose of comparing to these methods is to
show that when faced against a patch black-box adversary,
their detection performance degrades either against a novel
type of attack or larger perturbations. Note that, to the best
of our knowledge, there is only one other prior work that
explicitly targets adversarial patch detection [17], but their
source code is not publicly available, thus we omit it from
comparison.
IV. PERFORMANCE RESULTS
A. Training Details
We train a VGG-19 classifier on the CIFAR-10 dataset,
retain 10% of the training samples for validation, and obtain
a clean test accuracy of 89.95%. We further split our original
validation set in a new training and validation set and use the
training set to train H and the validation set to pick the best
wavelet denoising parameter σ. We perform a hyper-parameter
search for σ and find that 0.05 offers the best validation
performance. The training data for our detector consists of
adversarial samples generated with an untargeted PGD attack
with strength  ∈ {8, 16}/255, retaining only the successful
attacks. The negative class also includes noisy versions of the
training samples, with discrete uniform noise between [−3, 3]
(before any scaling) added independently on each pixel value.
The negative class validation data for the detector consists
of clean and noisy images. The positive class validation data
consists of successful adversarial samples generated with an
untargeted patch PGD attack with strength  = 64/255 run
for 100 steps.
The patch location is randomly selected as a rectangle with
sides between [4, 8] pixels and placed randomly at uniform in
a location in the sample, such that the entire patch is present
in the image. The architecture of the detector H is a three
hidden layer neural network, with two convolutional layers and
one fully-connected layer. We use L2 weight regularization of
5 × 10−3 during training to avoid over-fitting the detector to
the training data. We use values for κdet ∈ {0, 3} throughout
our experiments.
B. Black-Box Attacks
All attacks in this section and future sections, except for
the single-pixel attack, have complete knowledge about the
classifier architecture and weights θF , but are unaware that
there is a detection method in place.
1) PGD Attack
We generate 128 patch locations at random and for each
location we attack 256 randomly chosen test images. We
compare the performance of our algorithm with LID and the
TABLE II
BLACK-BOX PGD DETECTION PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF AREA UNDER THE RECEIVER OPERATING CURVE (ROC-AUC), AVERAGE PRECISION (AP)
AND FALSE POSITIVE RATE AT 95% TRUE POSITIVE RATE FOR THE PROPOSED METHOD, LID [16] AND BASELINE [12]. VALUES ARE PERCENTAGES.
Attack Attack Success Rate [%] ROC-AUC ↑ AP ↑ FPR at TPR=95% ↓(Baseline/LID/Ours) (Baseline/LID/Ours) (Baseline/LID/Ours)
PGD L∞,  = 8/255 15.89 88.93/81.07/93.38 46.67/49.18/75.27 29.72/53.72/25.75
PGD L∞,  = 16/255 25.55 82.78/77.37/98.20 38.29/39.54/96.44 43.60/65.57/6.67
PGD L∞,  = 64/255 62.77 60.58/63.47/99.95 29.38/25.72/99.96 81.52/87.04/0.03
PGD, Unrestricted 82.21 46.38/63.68/99.99 32.81/20.81/99.99 93.40/88.67/0.00
TABLE III
SUCCESS RATES (ON CLASSIFIER) AND DETECTION ACCURACY OF THE
PROPOSED METHOD FOR A NORM-RESTRICTED AND UNCONSTRAINED
BLACK-BOX C&W ADVERSARY WITH κdet = 3 AND κadv = 3.
Attack C&W L2 C&W, Unrestricted
Average Success Rate 50.1% 46.3%
Det. Accuracy 85.62% 98.55%
baseline approach against a black-box PGD adversary. We
perform a parameter search to find the best kLID (number of
nearest neighbors) and σLID values, using a batch size of 200
samples and the same training and validation data used for our
approach. The average performance results are shown in Table
II, where it can be seen that our proposed approach has better
generalization properties when testing on different attack types
and strengths. In particular, previous methods fail to identify
the localized changes introduced by an adversary and exhibit a
very high false positive rate. Our method with κdet = 0 shows
an opposite trend against the others: weaker attacks are harder
to detect. For fair comparison, we also include the success rate
of the PGD attack, where it can be seen that it is much lower
for a norm-bounded restricted adversary – thus the absolute
number of missed detections is also lower.
2) C&W Attack
For the norm-restricted C&W attack, we perform a binary
search for λ in the range [10−2, 1010]. In both attacks, a
square patch of size 6 × 6 is randomly placed at a location
of the image, and we optimize the objective in (4) with an
Adam optimizer, running for 10000 iterations each step of the
binary search. We pick 256 correctly classified images from
the test set, and run a targeted attack towards a random class
different that the ground truth. For all images, we test 40 patch
locations. We use κdet = 3 as a confidence threshold. The
results are summarized in Table III. We note that constraining
the patch attack implicitly helps it bypass detection, since a
more blended patch is generated, and our method explicitly
relies on the saliency of the perturbed region. For attacks that
bypass detection, the average L2 norm of the perturbation
is 0.247 and 0.3 for the restricted and unrestricted attacks,
respectively.
3) Brute-Force PGD Attack
We consider an adversary that suspects that there is a
detection method in place, but has no information (and does
not wish to make any assumptions) about – nor can they query
– the detector output. We place this adversary in the black-box
category, even though they are borderline gray-box. A feasible
Fig. 2. Variation of false positive rate and worst-case robustness with the κdet
parameter. The blue axis represents the proportion of images out of a 200
sample subset of the CIFAR-10 test set, for which a black-box, unrestricted
PGD attacker cannot find a single location of the patch that evades detection.
attack strategy in this case is to brute-force the location of the
patch in the image (e.g., spamming a face tagging system using
clone accounts). We evaluate the worst-case performance of
the detector against this adversary: if even a single location in
an image leads to a missed detection, we consider the entire
image compromised. The results are shown in Fig. 2, where it
can be seen that using the default value of κdet = 3 leads to a
worst-case detection rate of 8%.Increasing κdet to 8 increases
the false positive rate to 17%, but ensures that, on average,
half of the test samples are protected against all possible patch
locations attempted by a black-box adversary.
4) Single-Pixel Attack
We test the performance of our approach against the single-
pixel attack [11]. We run a targeted attack on 300 correctly
classified images in the test, for each other possible class
targeted, for a total of 2700 attacks, each for 200 iterations
(generations) and a population size of 75. A number of 300
attacks are successful in finding an adversary and only two
evade detection with κdet = 3. Interestingly, even without
using a confidence threshold, 60.33% of the successful single-
pixel attacks are detected by the detector H itself.
C. Adaptive (White-Box) Attacks
We evaluate the robustness of the residual detection method
against a C&W adversary that has complete knowledge of
the model, including the parameter σ used for performing
wavelet denoising, the confidence threshold κdet, and the
detector weights θH . Since the wavelet denoising block is
TABLE IV
SUCCESS RATE (SR) AND PERTURBATION DISTANCE FOR WHITE-BOX
ATTACKS ON THE PROPOSED DETECTION METHOD WITH κdet = 3.
Attack C&W L2 C&W, Unrestricted
Avg. SR 22.82% 32.05%
Worst-Case SR 72.65% 87.8%
Average L2 0.3 0.375
Worst-Case L2 0.286 0.344
non-differentiable, we apply the straight-through approach
[2] to estimate the hidden gradients, by exactly computing
the residual during the forward pass, and approximating its
gradient with unit value during the backward pass. The wavelet
denoising operation takes up a large part of the complexity
of this attack. For this reason, we perform it only every five
iterations, since we find that this does not hinder optimization.
We run our attacks on a detector with κdet = 3 and attack
a set of 256 correctly classified test images, with a targeted
attack to another random label. We run 2000 iterations per
binary search step for the restricted attack, for a number
of 7 steps, and we run 10000 iterations for the unrestricted
attack. Table IV presents the results in terms of success rate,
average and worst-case L2 distances, for the L2-constrained
and unrestricted white-box attacks. We note that the average
success rate is decreased when comparing to a black-box
adversary and the worst-case distortion increases by a factor of
1.5 times as well. Finally, the worst-case performance counts a
sample as compromised if at least one of the 40 patch locations
bypasses detection. The success rate of this attacker is close
to 100%, but with an increased distortion cost of 0.344. One
caveat here is that we did not search across all possible patch
locations, but only 40 out of 676, meaning it is likely possible
to increase this success rate to exactly 100% and the true
worst-case value of the required distortion.
D. Gray-Box Attacks
Finally, we investigate the transferability by assuming an
adversary has complete knowledge about the datasets used to
train and validate the performance of the detection scheme,
as well as the hard labels output by the detector during
training, but not testing phase. We train a deep convolutional
network with four convolutional layers to mimic the detector
as a substitute model, trained on the training set and the
predicted labels of the detector. We use the same L2 weight
regularization factor of 5 × 10−3. Then, we generate high
confidence white-box adversarial examples for the substitute
classifier-detector ensemble. Training the substitute model is
successful, with a validation accuracy of 98% on the same
data used by the detector. When testing, we generate 40 square
patches for 256 test images and obtain an attack transfer rate
of 100% on the classifier itself, but only a 15.22% rate on the
classifier-detector ensemble. We thus conclude that our method
resists the transfer of high-confidence examples.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the problem of detecting adversarial
samples generated by patch adversarial attacks in an attempt
to more closely match threat models that may arise in practical
situations. Our proposed solution uses the residual high-
frequency content of an image to distinguish between clean
and attacked samples. We have experimentally shown that
our method generalizes to strong black-box adversaries, resists
transfer attacks, and decreases the success rate of white-box
adversaries. Upon visually inspecting the images output by
an adaptive adversary, we make one interesting observation:
even though the required distortion increases, the patches have
smoother textures and color gradients. Thus, these represent
almost natural adversarial examples that bypass our wavelet-
based scheme. Future research directions deal with combining
our detector with other criteria to eliminate these blind spots.
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